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Introduction

People often perceive gains from having members of a community “buy
local.” At one end of the scale are formal schemes such as local currencies (such as Ithaca hours, Good, 1998). In the middle are organizations
(such as the Business Alliance for Local Living Economics, http://www.
livingeconomies.org) or norms (such as a custom of “keeping the money
at home” or a prescription that “you do business with those who do business
with you”) encouraging reciprocal buying habits. For example: 1
“I make my money here, and people naturally expect me to
spend it here. ... I’d be just as glad if you dealt with Jenson or
Ludelmeyer as much as you can, instead of Howland & Gould,
who go to Dr. Gould every last time ... I don’t see why I should
be paying out my good money for groceries and having them
pass it on to Terry Gould!”
“I’ve gone to Howland & Gould because they’re better, and
cleaner.”
“I know. ... Course Jenson is tricky—give you short weight—
and Ludelmeyer is a shiftless old Dutch hog. But same time, I
mean let’s keep the trade in the family whenever it is convenient,
see how I mean?”
At the other end are reciprocal relationships, of the form described in Ellickson (1991), in which people informally provide goods and services to one
another.
Why do people buy locally? The reciprocity built into buy local arrangements may bring social benefits—supporters often refer to local buying arrangements as playing an important role in building community spirit. Buy
local arrangements are often championed for their environmental benefits,
typically in the form of lower transportation costs. Buying locally may make
it easier for consumers to influence conditions of production, from ensuring
1

Sinclair Lewis, Main Street, International Collector’s Library, Garden City, NY, 1948;

95.
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that products are “natural” to seeing that workers are treated fairly. Buying
locally may be a way of providing public goods, perhaps in the form of a
diverse or picturesque local business district.
We argue that it is not necessary to introduce social factors, environmental considerations, influence, or externalities to account for buy local
relationships. Buying locally can be beneficial even when agents are motivated strictly by selfish concerns.
A buy local arrangement is clearly in an agent’s best interest if the
goods and services provided by the partners in the arrangement are routinely
better than any other on offer. But how do we account for the behavior
in the preceding excerpt, where this is not the case? The essence of a
buy local arrangement is its reciprocity—agent i buys from another agent j
within the arrangement even when j’s price-quality package isn’t the best
on offer because j will similarly buy from within the arrangement in similar
circumstances. This reciprocity may be valuable in a world of monopolistic
competition. Each seller, facing a downward sloping demand function, sets
price above marginal cost and so receives a strictly positive profit from an
additional sale. Agent j may not have the optimal price-quality package, but
if the utility i foregoes from purchasing from j is less than j’s gain from the
transaction, and i similarly makes sales within the arrangement that would
not otherwise occur, the members of the arrangement are made better off
by the buy local arrangement.
Buy local arrangements involve tradeoffs between agents-as-firms making additional profitable sales and agents-as-consumers making suboptimal
purchases. In order for a buy local arrangement to be beneficial, the costs of
making suboptimal purchases cannot be too large. Equivalently, the goods
available inside the buy local arrangement should be at least plausible substitutes for the consumers’ most preferred choices. This is more likely if
the members of the buy local arrangement are “close” in some appropriate sense. This suggests that communities connected by common interests,
culture, or physical proximity are ideal candidates for successful buy local
arrangements.
Our model of monopolistic competition is a special case of Hart (1985),
in which we take the number and composition of firms in the market as
fixed. Agents act as both consumers and firms. Firms post prices and
consumers, acting as price takers, then choose which firms to patronize.
Because the firms are monopolistically competitive and hence sell at prices
higher than marginal cost, each firm would like to sell more at its current
price. We allow a subset of agents to engage in a buy local relationship. This
reciprocal patronage will often call for consumers to settle for something
2

less than their most-preferred good. The return for doing so is that the buy
local arrangement allows the agents’ firms to increase the quantity they sell
without reducing their price.
Because its participants sometimes forgo their most-preferred product, a
buy local arrangement requires monitoring and enforcement. We return to
these considerations in Section 4, noting here that the various types of buy
local arrangements mentioned in our opening paragraph solve these problems
in different ways. Local currencies can serve as a monitoring device, ensuring
that one can reap the benefits of additional sales only if one accepts the
local currency, in much the same way that money can serve as memory
(Kocherlakota, 1998). The doctor in the Main Street example may pay
the same for his groceries as does the rest of the public, just as the shopkeeper may pay for his office visits, each incurring costs (the purchaser will
sometimes prefer to buy elsewhere) to boost the demand of the other, with
networks of gossip providing the required monitoring and enforcement. The
transactions in reciprocal conventions may take place without transfers—
Alice the plumber may fix Bob’s sink whenever needed, while Bob the roofer
takes care of Alice’s roof—with the monitoring and enforcement arising out
of the bilateral and repeated nature of the interaction.

2

An Example: The Benefits of Buying Locally

We begin with an economy with a numeraire good, produced by a perfectly
competitive industry employing a constant-returns-to-scale technology, as
well as goods 1 and 2. There are four firms in the economy, denoted by
{fij : i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2}. Firm fij produces good j, so that there are two
firms producing each good. Firms costlessly produce output, though this
simplifying assumption is not essential.
The owners of the firms constitute the consumers in the economy. For
simplicity, we assume each firm fij is owned by one consumer aij . Consumers
behave competitively, in the sense that the price and profit of firm fij are
taken to be exogenous in consumer aij ’s utility maximization problem. This
is equivalent to assuming each firm is owned by a continuum of identical
consumers (as assumed by Hart, 1985).
Consumers receive utility from consumption of the numeraire and the
two goods. The utilities a consumer obtains from purchasing good j from
firm f1j and from firm f2j are stochastic. It is sometimes preferable to buy
good j from firm f1j and sometimes preferable to buy from firm f2j . Firm
fij ’s product may be distinguished by a flavor, color, size, function, or other
3

characteristics that the consumer sometimes prefers to others. We model
these random preferences by assuming that each consumer aij takes four
independent uniform draws from the unit interval, with the realization λ`k
determining for good k the distance between the consumer’s ideal good and
the good produced by firm f`k . This distance arises in a space of product
characteristics that may or may not have geographic distance as one of its
dimensions. In particular, consumer aij may find the good produced by its
own firm less attractive than the same good produced by the other firm (i.e.,
λij > λ`j , ` 6= i).
For each consumer, aij , let 1`k denote the indicator equaling 1 if the
consumer purchases good k from firm f`k (possibly the firm the consumer
owns), and 0 otherwise. Consumer aij buys either zero or one unit of goods
1 and 2, receiving utility
z+

2
X

`,k=1

(Λk − λ`k )1`k ,

where z is the consumption of the numeraire, 11k 12k = 0, and Λ1 and Λ2
are constants larger than 2. Consumer aij ’s budget constraint is
X
p`k 1`k + z = π ij + Z,
`,k

where p`k is the price of firm f`k ’s good, π ij is the profit earned by aij ’s
firm, and Z is an endowment of the numeraire larger than Λ 1 + Λ2 . This
endowment ensures that we need not be concerned with corner solutions.

2.1

The Market Outcome

We first calculate the market outcome. Each of the four firms simultaneously sets a price. Simultaneously, consumers receive their distance draws.
After observing their distance draws and the firms’ prices, each of the four
consumers chooses a firm from whom to purchase each good (or does not
purchase at all).
Consider good j and suppose consumers face prices p1j and p2j from firms
f1j and f2j . A consumer, having drawn distances λ1j and λ2j , purchases
from firm f1j if Λj −λ1j −p1j > max{0, Λj −λ2j −p2j }. It is straightforward
to verify that there is a symmetric monopolistic equilibrium with prices
p1j = p2j = 12 , and that this is the unique equilibrium. 2 Given these common
2

The calculations are in Appendix A.1. This example is a special case of the model in
Section 3.2, and the equilibrium prices can also be deduced from that analysis.
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prices, each consumer purchases from the firm closest to the consumer. Each
firm receives an expected payoff of π = 1 (a price of 1/2, and probability 1/2
that each of the four consumers are closest to the firm and hence purchase
from it, for an expectation of two purchases). 3 Each consumer has expected
income 1 (received from its firm). Consumers can borrow and lend costlessly
on a competitive capital market, so that their budget constraint need only
hold in expectation. Because Λ 1 and Λ2 each exceed 2, each consumer
purchases both goods, regardless of her distance draws, and (in expectation)
purchases none of the numeraire. The ex ante expected utility produced by
good j is
Z 1
1
(1)
(Λj − λ)2(1 − λ)dλ = Λj − ,
3
0
where 2(1 −λ) is the density of the minimum of two independent draws from
uniform distributions on [0, 1]. Summing the utility from the two goods,
each consumer receives ex ante expected utility Λ 1 + Λ2 − 23 , and so the total
market surplus is 4Λ1 + 4Λ2 − 83 .

2.2

Buying Locally

Now suppose that consumers a11 and a12 agree that they will patronize only
each others’ firms (firms f11 and f12 ), regardless of the consumer draws they
happen to receive. They agree to hold their prices constant at 1/2 (we come
back to this assumption in Section 3.3; this will be the equilibrium price in
the presence of the buy local arrangement, see Proposition 2). We refer to
this as a buy local arrangement and these two agents as inside agents (and
agents not in the arrangement as outside agents). Under this arrangement,
there will be circumstances in which an inside consumer is buying from an
inside firm even though she would prefer to buy from an outside firm.
Consider agent a11 . The expected profit of this agent’s firm f11 is
1+

1
3
= ,
2
2

since consumers a11 and a12 always purchase from this firm, and consumers
a21 and a22 each find that firm f11 has the lowest distance draw, and hence
purchase from f11 (at price 1/2), with probability 1/2. Consumer a11 receives expected utility
3
1 1
1 1
1
+ Λ1 − − + Λ2 − − = Λ 1 + Λ2 − ,
2
2 2
2 2
2
3

Under the interpretation that each consumer is a representative of a continuum of
consumers, there is no aggregate uncertainty and firm payoffs are not random.

5

since this consumer receives profit 3/2 from her firm, always buys from firms
f11 and f12 at price 1/2, and the expected distance when buying the good
from firm f1k is 1/2.
Thus, each inside agent has higher payoff under the buy local arrangement than in the competitive equilibrium. The loss of utility from sometimes
buying from an inside firm when the outside firm has a lower distance draw
is more than compensated for by the increased profits.
The outside agent a2k receives 1/2 from his firm, since only consumers
a21 and a22 purchase from f2k and then only when that firm has the lower
distance draw. Agent a2k receives expected utility (recall (1))
1
1 1
1 1
7
+ Λ1 − − + Λ2 − − = Λ 1 + Λ2 − ,
2
3 2
3 2
6
smaller than without the buy local arrangement. Total surplus is 4Λ 1 +
4Λ2 − 10/3, less than the total (of 4Λ 1 + 4Λ2 − 83 ) in the absence of the
buying locally arrangement.
Insiders gain in the buy local equilibrium because their consumer loss
from patronizing one another is less than their firms’ gain. The basic forces
behind this result, which we expect to be robust to variations in the model,
are that marginal consumers who patronize an inside rather than an outside
firm are close to indifferent between the two firms, and hence will sacrifice
little. The imperfectly competitive firms are setting prices above marginal
cost and hence gain relatively more, leading to an aggregate gain for inside
agents. These gains reflect the fact that monopolistically competitive firms
price above marginal cost, and hence are always anxious to sell more at their
going price.

2.3

Exploiting Outsiders?

The buy local arrangement in our example reallocates some surplus from
outsiders to insiders, sacrificing some in the process. This gives the buy local
arrangement a similarity to a prisoners’ dilemma. The agents in location 2
have an incentive to also form a buy local arrangement, regardless of whether
the agents in location 1 do so. But the worst outcome is for both locations
to form (separate) buy local arrangements, so that no firm reaps the benefits
of increased sales while consumers find their choices restricted.
A buy local arrangement need not always involve a reallocation of surplus
from outsiders to insiders. Consider again the previous example, but suppose
that firms f21 and f22 are replaced by a perfectly competitive market. In
particular, each of these producers has constant marginal and average cost
6

given by 1/2. As a result, they will supply an arbitrarily large amount of
good 1 or good 2 at any price at least 1/2, and will supply nothing at lower
prices. Firms f11 and f12 remain as before, as do consumers. Then:
• There are no gains to a21 and a22 from forming a buy local arrangement. The payoffs to such an arrangement come from directing strictly
profitable purchases that formerly went outside to the insiders of the
arrangement. There are now no strictly profitable purchases for firms
f21 and f22 , and hence no such gains to be had. Similarly, consumers
a21 and a22 lose nothing when location-1 agents form a buy local arrangement.
• The calculation of the benefits to consumers a11 and a12 from forming
a buy local arrangement remain just as before.
In this case the buy local arrangement is surplus enhancing. Independent
of the effect on outsiders, there is an efficiency gain associated with a buy
local arrangement because it allows us to partially overcome the inefficiency
of imperfect competition, and in this case doing so imposes no costs.
The essence of the buy local arrangement is that monopolistic competition leads to prices that exceed marginal cost. We have worked with a
particularly simple monopolistically competitive market, but the fine details of the model are not important as long as prices exceed marginal cost.
Some potentially profitable trades will then go unexploited. The buy local
arrangement allows some such trades to be made, enhancing total surplus.

3
3.1

Buying Locally
The Model

We next set out a general model that extends the example of Section 2.
We use this model to determine what kinds of buy local agreements will be
profitable for the participants and to identify conditions under which buy
local agreements cannot be struck.
There are M goods, each of which is produced by N firms. For many of
our examples we take M = 2. Each firm fij produces good j and is owned
by the competitive consumer aij .4 As before, for each consumer, aij , let 1`k
4
While a continuum population of consumers provides a foundation for the assumption
that consumers are competitive, it is not necessary. The important point is that consumers
are competitive. We assume each firm is owned by a finite number of consumers to
emphasize that our analysis does not require a large population of consumers.
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denote the indicator equaling 1 if the consumer purchases good k from firm
f`k (possibly the firm the consumer owns), and 0 otherwise. Consumer aij
buys either zero or one unit of each good k, receiving utility
X
Z + π ij +
(Λk − λ`k − p`k )1`k ,
`,k

P
where Z > k Λk is the endowment of numeraire, 1`k 1`0 k = 0 if ` 6= `0 , p`k
is the price at firm f`k , and π ij is the profit earned by aij ’s firm. We will
often interpret the indices i and ` as identifying locations, with fij and aij
for a fixed value of i identifying the various firms and at location i and the
consumers who own them.
For each good, each consumer takes n distance draws from n firms that
produce that good, capturing the relative attractiveness of those goods.
Distance draws are independent across consumers and goods, taken from a
uniform distribution on the unit interval. We necessarily have n ≤ N , and
we assume n ≥ 2, so that there is competition between firms.
If n = N , every agent aij takes (for every good) a distance draw from
every location. If n < N , then the consumer takes a draw from some,
but not all, locations. The firms for which consumer aij takes distance
draws, for each good, are determined (possibly randomly) as part of the
specification of the model. For example, consumer aij may take a distance
draw from firm f7k , with probability one, but from firm f28k with probability
zero. There might be some randomness in determining the identity of the
firms from whom distance draws are taken: if n = 3, consumer a2j may
draw from firms f1k and f3k with probability one, and from another firm
equally likely to be any one of firms f4k , . . . , fN k . Together, the ability to
choose the magnitude of n and the specification of which consumers take
distance draws from which firms gives us a great deal of flexibility, allowing
us to model interesting heterogeneity with which to explore structures of
buy local arrangements that might be profitable. We will be more specific
about our assumptions on the distance draws when we introduce buy local
arrangements.
The timing is as follows: First, firms post prices and consumers take
distance draws, and then consumers (having observed prices and distance
draws) purchase from their preferred firm. Consumers can purchase only
from firms from whom they have taken a distance draw.
The distance draws generate a network in which consumers and firms
are the nodes. We say there is a link between consumer aij and firm f`k if
consumer aij takes a distance draw from firm f`k . The network is random if
there is randomness in the identity of the firms from whom consumers take
8

distance draws. If not, the network is deterministic.
Two characteristics of the network will be important. First, every consumer in the network has deterministic degree n, where n is the number
of distance draws the consumer takes. At one extreme, we have the case
in which n = N , so that every consumer takes a distance draw from every firm (that is, the network is complete bipartite: agents are divided into
two groups, firms and consumers, and every consumer is connected to every firm). At the other extreme, corresponding to the case n = 1, is the
monopolistic network, which we exclude with our assumption that n ≥ 2.
Second, it need not be the case that every firm has the same degree, even
if the network is deterministic. In the case of a random network, the firm
realized degrees will obviously vary. The firms’ expected degrees may also
vary. We say that the network is uniform if each consumer is equally likely
to take a distance draw from each firm. Notice that for each n ≥ 2, there is
a uniform network with that value of n.

3.2

Equilibrium Prices

The competitive equilibrium in the absence of a buy local arrangement is
easily characterized.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and in this
equilibrium, every firm prices at 1/n.
The proof, given in Appendix A.2, is a straightforward calculation. The
key to uniqueness is that optimal prices depend on the number of distance
draws each customer takes, but not on the number of customers who go
to a firm. Hence, we can identify the equilibrium price once we know n,
the number of distance draws each agent takes, without knowing anything
about the firms from whom these draws are taken. In equilibrium, every
firm will choose the same price.

3.3

Buy Local Arrangements

For simplicity, we analyze a particularly elementary form of buy local arrangement, a simple buy local arrangement : The set of agents in a simple
buy local arrangement is a set of agents AL := {aij : i ∈ L, j = 1, . . . , M },
where L ⊂ {1, . . . , N }. Hence, if one consumer or firm at some location i
is involved in the buy local arrangement, then everyone at the location is
involved. In an abuse of notation, we denote the number of locations in set
L also by L. In a simple buy local arrangement, if a consumer aij in the
9

arrangement receives at least one distance draw for good k from a firm f`k
who is in the arrangement, then aij purchases good k within the arrangement. A consumer who receives no distance draws for good k from within
the arrangement cannot buy inside, and is free to purchase outside.
A buy local arrangement is a social arrangement, and the membership of
stable (or equilibrium) buy local arrangements will presumably reflect the
network structure of the network draws (such as clustering). We interpret
agents with a common index i as being grouped together by the network
draws in such a way as to make them a natural candidate for membership in a buy local arrangement. They may occupy a particular geographic
neighborhood. They may be members of a church, fraternal organization,
or ethnic minority. They may simply be a group of people who have strong
social ties. One characteristic making a group a “natural candidate” for a
buy local arrangement is the ability of members to monitor one another.
We consider simple symmetric patterns of clustering in network draws. 5
The restrictions constrain the pattern and nature of clustering of the distance draws, and we are interested in clusters of consumers and firms that
have value as simple buy local arrangements. We say the distance draw
network is AL -symmetric if:
1. the probability distribution over the number of distance draws from
firms within L is the same for all consumers in L and all goods; and
2. if consumer aij in L takes m good k draws from firms in L, each firm
in L is drawn with probability m/L.6
The complete bipartite network (in which n = N ) is AL -symmetric for
all L ⊂ {1, . . . , N }, as is any uniform network. Many other distance draw
networks will be AL -symmetric for some choices of L. For example, each
agent may take L draws from inside L and n − L outside draws (perhaps
from randomly determined firms). We would interpret this as a case in which
consumers can always purchase from any firm within their community, as
well as sometimes encountering opportunities to purchase outside.
When the distance draw network is AL -symmetric, the costs and benefits from the simple buy local arrangement for AL are uniformly distributed
among AL , allowing us to rely on arguments that focus on a representative
member of the arrangement. Notice that AL -symmetry allows the distribution of consumer distance draws to treat firms inside and outside AL
5

We discuss asymmetries in Section 3.6.
Equivalently, any m firms producing good k within L are equally likely to be drawn
(from).
6

10

quite differently, and we shall see that this difference is important to the
profitability of buy-local arrangements.
We assume that in the presence of a buy local arrangement, firms continue to set prices to maximize profits. This assumption is innocuous. This
pricing rule allows the firms inside the buy local arrangement to optimally
extract surplus from outsiders, with no adverse effects on insiders since,
given our symmetry assumptions, the prices paid by inside consumers to
inside firms are pure transfers that wash out in expectation, and hence have
no economic impact.7 In some buy-local arrangements, it may well be most
convenient for insiders to pay the market price, so that (for example) some
customers of a butcher shop do not wonder why they are paying while others
are not. The impact of the agreement would be unchanged if insiders paid a
different (common) price, perhaps (for example) because a pair of people in
a reciprocal arrangement find it more convenient not to collect payments.
There is always a profitable simple buy local arrangement.
Proposition 2.
(2.1) The equilibrium prices in the presence of a simple buy local arrangement equal 1/n, the equilibrium prices without such an arrangement.
(2.2) Suppose the network is AL -symmetric for a set AL satisfying L =
N − 1. If there is positive probability that consumers in AL draw from
firm outside AL , then the simple buy local arrangement for AL is strictly
profitable for its members.
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the calculations behind the
introductory example and is given in Appendix A.3. However, the simple
buy local arrangement we use in the proof to demonstrate existence of a
profitable arrangement is crude, since it uses little of the structural features
of the network relating consumers to firms. In particular, the arrangement
consists of all but one of the firms.
Proposition 2 is silent about the optimal buy local arrangement. In general, the optimal buy local arrangement need not be simple. In expectation,
the consumer losses in a simple buy local arrangement are smaller than the
gains enjoyed by firms. However, there will be instances in which a consumer
is forced to purchase inside the arrangement even though the reduction in
distance draw they could achieve by purchasing outside exceeds the price.
7

There might yet be some impact from altering prices if these affect the purchase
decisions of inside consumers, but the buy local arrangement is successful precisely because
inside consumers sometimes ignore their price signals, and the most effective arrangement
will set the price so as to maximize the payoff from selling to outsiders, while making
separate arrangements governing the purchases of insiders.
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The buy local arrangement would be even more valuable if the arrangement called for consumers to purchase inside only when the price exceeds
the resulting difference in distance draws, so that every diverted transaction
enhances the welfare of those in the arrangement. However, the monitoring
required to sustain such an arrangement would likely be difficult. 8 We restrict attention to simple arrangements, viewing this as reflecting limits on
the feasibility for such arrangements.

3.4

Uniform Networks

The structure of the network induced by the consumers’ distance draws plays
a central role in the feasibility and optimality of buy local arrangements.
We first consider uniform networks—networks in which every firm is equally
likely to be the target of a distance draw for each consumer. There are many
uniform networks, differing in the number of distance draws each consumer
takes. Notice that our symmetry assumptions on consumers’ distance draws
are necessarily satisfied in this case.
We next show that uniform networks require buy local arrangements of
implausibly large sizes in order to be profitable, and hence that plausible
buy local arrangements are closely linked to nontrivial network structures.
We begin with the case of n = 2, so that for each good each consumer
takes two distance draws, and with each pair of firms in the economy equally
likely to be the targets of those draws. In the absence of a buy local arrangement, the equilibrium price is, from Proposition 1,
p=

1
2

and the expected distance produced by a pair of distance draws is the expected value of the first-order statistic of two uniform draws, which is 13 .
Now consider a simple buy local arrangement consisting of LM consumers, which (as usual) we can interpret as consisting of the M consumers
residing at each of L locations. From Proposition 2, the price remains 1/2.
The outcome under the buy local arrangement only differs from the monopolistic equilibrium for an agent when there is a good for which the agent
takes one inside draw, one outside draw, and the inside distance draw is
larger than the outside distance draw. Denote this event by G. Conditional
on this event, the expected value of the outside draw is the expected value
of the first-order statistic of a uniform distribution, 1/3, while the expected
value of the inside draw is the expected value of the second-order statistic,
8

We return to the issue of enforcement in Section 4.1.
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2/3. Hence, the net gain of the arrangement, per agent and per good, is
given by
 

N −L
1 L


1
1 1
1 2 1
1 L(N − L)
 
=
Pr(G) =
−
.
N
2 3
6
6 N (N − 1)
2

This expression is positive, for all L < N . The costs and benefits of any
such transaction will typically accrue to different people, but our symmetry
assumptions ensure that the new benefits are uniformly distributed among
the members of the arrangement, and hence that the arrangement is profitable for each of its members, for any L < N . The per capita profitability
of the arrangement is maximized by choosing the size L of the buy local
arrangement to maximize Pr(G), which is done by setting L equal equal to
one of the integers closest to N/2 (which may be N/2). Hence all simple
buy local arrangements are profitable, while the optimal such arrangement
includes half of the agents in the economy.
Now consider the other extreme of the complete bipartite network, that
is, n = N , so that for every good every consumer takes a distance draw from
every firm. ¿From Proposition 1, the equilibrium price is 1/N . The gain
per agent and per good of a buy local arrangement of size L is given by
N −L 1
,
N N
since this gain comes from the prospect that a member of the buy local
arrangement may bring a purchase at price 1/N inside the arrangement
instead of going outside, and each such consumer formerly purchased outside
with probability (N − L)/N . The cost per agent and per good is


1
1
,
−
L+1 N +1
since the consumer expects a minimum distance of 1/(N + 1) from being
able to purchase anywhere in the market, and only expects a minimum from
buying inside the arrangement of 1/(L + 1). The buy local arrangement
with K agents thus has a per capita and per good gain of


1
1
N −L
.
(2)
−
−
N2
L+1 N +1
Once again our symmetry assumptions ensure that the costs and benefits of
the buy local agreement are uniformly distributed among the participants,
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and hence that if (2) is positive, then every agent in the buy local agreement
gains from the agreement.
The expression in (2) is concave in L, equals zero at L = N , and is
negative at L = 0. Simple buy local arrangements will then be profitable
for all values of L between some minimum size L and N − 1. Setting (2)
equal to zero and rearranging yields
(N − L)[(L + 1)(N + 1) − N 2 ] = 0.
The minimum profitable buy local size L is the smallest integer larger than
N 2 /(N − 1) − 1, giving L = N − 1. A simple buy local arrangement in
a complete bipartite network is only profitable if it includes all but the
consumers at one location.
What explains the difference between these two results? In the complete
network there are many substitutes for each good. As a result, the equilibrium price is low (1/N ), while a small buy local arrangement has a large
likelihood that a group member’s best outside consumer draw is significantly
lower than the best inside draw. The benefits of small arrangements (many
sales transferred from outside to inside) are thus relatively small compared
to the costs (foregone consumer draws), and to be profitable, groups of participants must be large. In contrast, when n = 2, there are few substitutes,
the equilibrium price is high (1/2), and there is a little likelihood that a
group member’s outside consumer draw is significantly lower than the inside draw. In this case, redirecting sales inside is always profitable, and any
size arrangement is profitable.
How large must uniform networks be in order to be profitable, when
they are less extreme than the case in which each agent takes 2 draws or the
case of the complete bipartite network? The large buy local arrangements
that are required for profitability of the complete bipartite network are more
representative than the smaller profitable buy local arrangements of n = 2.
For example, for any n ≥ 3, in order to be profitable, a simple buy local
arrangement must include at least one third of the agents in the economy:
Proposition 3. Suppose n ≥ 3. A simple buy local arrangement of size L
is profitable in a uniform network only if
L−1>

n2 − 3n + 1
(N − 2).
n2 − 2n

(3)

We prove this result in Appendix A.4 as a corollary of Proposition 4.
As the number n of distance draws taken by an agent grows, the fraction
in (3) approaches unity, implying that a profitable buy local arrangement
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will include virtually all of the agents in the economy. We regard such
arrangements as implausible, noting that actual buy local arrangements,
reflecting their name, typically do not include almost everyone in the world.

3.5

Structured Networks

The counterintuitive prospect of buy local arrangements comprising almost
the entire economy leads us to investigate networks that are not uniform.
In particular, we believe that buy local networks are likely to involve groups
of people who are relatively isolated, in the sense that their distance draws
are relatively likely to come from inside the group.
Rather than impose a specific structure on the buy local arrangement
and the network, we instead ask for an arbitrary set of agents AL and AL symmetric network, what is required for each member of AL to find the
simple buy local arrangement for AL beneficial.
A buy local arrangement has an effect only if a purchase that would
ordinarily be made outside the arrangement is diverted to an inside producer.
The profitability of the arrangement hinges on comparing the gain from such
a diversion, namely the price paid to the firm, to the cost, in the form of a
less desired good for the consumer. To get an idea of the latter, we note that
such a diversion occurs only if the consumer’s lowest distance draw comes
from outside the arrangement. The diversion will be least costly when the
consumer’s second-lowest distance draw comes from inside the arrangement.
The following proposition shows that the buy local arrangement will be
profitable only if diverted purchases are sufficiently likely to fall into this
least-cost category.
Proposition 4. Fix a set of agents AL , an AL -symmetric network, a consumer aij , and a good. Let E1 denote the event that agent aij ’s lowest
distance draw for the good is from outside AL and there exists at least one
draw for the good from within AL . Let E2 ⊂ E1 denote the subevent of E1
where additionally agent aij ’s second lowest draw is from inside AL . Then,
the buy local arrangement for AL is profitable for agent aij only if
Pr(E2 | E1 ) >

n−1
.
n

(4)

Proof. The buy local arrangement has an effect only if there is some agent
aij who draws his minimum distance draw for some good from outside the
buy local arrangement, and takes at least one draw from inside, i.e., only
on E1 . Our symmetry assumptions ensure that the buy local arrangement
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is beneficial for (all of) its members if and only if the net benefit generated
by such an event is positive. An upper bound on the net benefit is


1
2
3
1
,
(5)
−
Pr(E2 | E1 ) +
(1 − Pr(E2 | E1 )) −
n
n+1
n+1
n+1
where 1/n is the price of the trade that is diverted inside, 1/(n + 1) (the
expected value of the first-order statistic) is the expected value of the minimum distance draw, which by assumption comes from outside AL , 2/(n + 1)
(the expected value of the second-order statistic) is the expected value of
the best inside distance draw if the second largest draw comes from inside
AL , 3/(n + 1) (the expected value of the third-order statistic) is a lower
bound on the expected value of the best inside draw if the second-smallest
draw does not come from inside, and Pr(E2 | E1 ) is the probability that the
second-smallest draw comes from inside AL (given that the smallest draw
is outside and there is at least one inside draw). This is an upper bound
because 3/(n + 1) in general underestimates the distance draw taken from
inside AL . Notice that the expected value of the buy local arrangement is
profitable on the event E2 that the second lowest draw come from inside
AL , but not otherwise.
The result now follows from noting that the upper bound on profits (5)
is nonnegative if and only if Pr(E2 | E1 ) > (n − 1)/n.
The implication of this result is that buy local arrangements will be profitable only if, whenever a consumer’s first choice is to purchase outside, it
is sufficiently likely that her second choice comes from inside the arrangement. This is in turn likely if the consumer takes many distance draws from
within the arrangement. Consumers who take most of their draws from outside will not find buy local arrangements profitable. The following example
illustrates.
Example. As a simple example of a structured network, suppose there is
a group AL in which each member receives one distance draw from within
the group and two other distance draws uniformly drawn from all firms.
Consumers outside AL receive three distance draws uniformly drawn from
all firms. The equilibrium price, with or without a buy local arrangement,
is
p=
and the expected distance is 1/4.
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1
3

Given the symmetry in this group, the condition in Proposition 4 is
necessary for a buy local arrangement for AL to be profitable. Since there
are only three draws, the condition is also sufficient. It remains to evaluate
the inequality Pr(E2 | E1 ) > 2/3.
Let Fb be the event that there are b inside draws and 3 − b outside
draws, for b = 1, 2. Let Gb ⊂ Fb be the event that there are b inside
draws, 3 − b outside draws, and that (the minimum of) the inside draw is
greater than (the minimum of) the outside draw, for b = 1, 2. Note that
E1 = G1 ∪ G2 , G2 ⊂ E2 ⊂ G1 ∪ G2 , and Pr(E2 | G1 ) = 1/2. [To verify the
last assertion, let λi be the draw from the consumer’s firm, λo be the draw
from the outside firm that is the lowest draw overall, and λ the remaining
draw that may be inside or outside. On E2 , either λ is drawn from an inside
firm (corresponding to G2 ) or λ is drawn from an outside firm and λi < λ
(which occurs with probability 1/2 on G1 ).]
Moreover, Pr(G1 ) = Pr(G1 | F1 ) Pr(F1 ) = (2/3) Pr(F1 ) and Pr(G2 ) =
Pr(G2 | F2 ) Pr(F2 ) = (1/3) Pr(F2 ).
Substituting,
Pr(E2 )
Pr(E2 | G1 ) Pr(G1 ) + Pr(E2 | G2 ) Pr(G2 )
2
=
< Pr(E2 | E1 ) =
3
Pr(E1 )
Pr(G1 ) + Pr(G2 )
Pr(F1 ) + Pr(F2 )
=
2 Pr(F1 ) + Pr(F2 )
is equivalent to Pr(F2 ) > Pr(F1 ).
Thus, we have the condition that a simple buy local arrangement in this
structured network is profitable if and only if the probability of sampling
more inside firms is higher than the probability of sampling more outside
firms. A profitable simple buy local arrangement requires a group of agents
who are sufficiently likely to take distance draws from one another.
F
The case of deterministically structured networks provides another illustration.
Proposition 5. Suppose there is a group of L agents, each of whom takes
n distance draws, with 1 ≤ m ≤ min{n, L} draws from inside the group and
n − m from outside the group. A simple buy local arrangement by this group
is profitable if and only if
m = n − 1.
(6)
Proof. The equilibrium price is 1/n. Hence, the per capita and per good
gain from the arrangement is (n − m)/n2 , since (n − m)/n is the probability
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that an insider would have purchased outside, and has her purchase pushed
inside, bringing a price of 1/n inside the arrangement. The per capita and
per good cost of the arrangement is
1
1
−
,
m+1 n+1
since the expected minimum distance draw is now 1/(m + 1) rather than
1/(n + 1). The net gain of the arrangement is
(n − m)
n−m1
1
1
(n − m)
−
−
−
=
.
2
n n m+1 n+1
n
(m + 1)(n + 1)
This expression is positive (which, given our symmetry assumptions, suffices
for each member to gain from the arrangement) if and only if
(m + 1)(n + 1) > n2 ,
which requires m = n − 1.
Note that the result of Proposition 5 is quite different from the observation that buy local arrangements for complete bipartite network are
profitable only if L = N − 1 (from Section 3.4). In Section 3.4, the network
is complete (and so there is no sense of distinct communities within the
network), while in Proposition 5, we are examining a community of agents,
and in order for the arrangement to be profitable, the community must be
close-knit, in that all but one of the members’ distance draws must come
from within the community.
Who then will form buy local arrangements? Communities that are
already tightly knit, in the sense that they already do most of their business
with one another. This includes isolated communities, such as Ithaca, whose
geography ensures that they do most of their business with one another, and
close communities, such as south Philadelphia, whose customs have the same
effect.

3.6

Product Asymmetries

We have assumed that buy local arrangements included sets of agents of the
form {aij : i ∈ L, j = 1, . . . , M }, where L ⊂ {1, . . . , N }. Our symmetry
assumptions on distance draws ensure that this is without loss of generality.
If it is profitable to include one good in the arrangement, it is profitable
to include all. Equivalently, if one consumer at location i is involved, then
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all consumers at this location will benefit from being included. This had
the advantage of allowing us to conduct our analysis on a per agent and
per good basis, isolating the forces behind the buy local arrangement with
a minimum of clutter.
It requires only more tedious calculations to drop the symmetry assumptions and consider buy local arrangements for arbitrary subsets of
{1, . . . , N } × {1, . . . , M }. The most obvious extension is to allow the firms
from whom distance draws are taken to differ across goods. Buy local arrangements would then in general include some goods and exclude others, in
some cases including only one good j. The inherent separability across commodities implies that our analysis also covers the case of multiple disjoint
buy local arrangements, perhaps involving the same agents but different
goods.
We consider here a different source of asymmetry across products, involving the distributions from which the distance draws at a particular firm
are taken, and how this can present a barrier to buy local arrangements.
If one consumer is almost indifferent over the source of the good purchased
but another is not, an arrangement involving the two may not be possible.
To see this, return to our introductory example, with two modifications.
First, suppose that consumer ai1 consumes only good 2, and consumer ai2
consumes only good 1. Second, suppose that the distance draws for goods
1 and 2, instead of being uniformly drawn on the unit interval, are uniˉ 1 ] and [0, λ
ˉ 2 ]. Smaller intervals will characterize more
formly drawn on [0, λ
homogeneous goods and hence more competitive markets.
Consider the market for good j. Calculations analogous to those done
for the symmetric model given an equilibrium price
p 1 = p2 =

ˉj
λ
.
2

As expected, the price collapses to zero as zj approaches zero and hence the
output of the two firms become perfect substitutes.
We begin by calculating payoffs in the market in the absence of a buy
local arrangement. Let Λ1 = Λ2 ≡ Λ. For owners of firms producing good
ˉ 1 /2. The consumer payoff is (recall the owner consumes good
1, profits are λ
ˉ 2 /2 − λ2 is the utility garnered from purchasing good 2
2, and that Λ2 − λ
ˉ 2 /2, with distance draw λ2 , while 2(λ
ˉ 2 − λ2 )/λ
ˉ 2 is the
at the going price, λ
2
ˉ 2 ])
density of the minimum of two draws from a uniform distribution on [0, λ
Z

ˉ2
λ
0



Λ−

 ˉ
ˉ2
5ˉ
λ
( λ2 − λ 2 )
dλ2 = Λ − λ
− λ2 2
2.
ˉ2
6
2
λ
2
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ˉ1 = λ
ˉ 2 = 1. We get analogous
This matches our previous result when λ
results for owners of firms producing good 2. Hence, under the market, the
total (producer plus consumer) payoffs of agents earning firms producing
goods 1 and 2 are, respectively
ˉ1
ˉ2
λ
λ
5ˉ
5ˉ
Λ− λ
and Λ − λ
.
2+
1+
2
2
6
6
Now consider a buy local arrangement between agents ai1 and ai2 . A
ˉ 1 /2)(3/2) while the owner’s utility from confirm producing good 1 earns ( λ
ˉ
ˉ
ˉ 2 , where the first λ
ˉ 2 /2 is the price
sumption is now Λ − λ2 /2 − λ2 /2 = Λ − λ
paid for the good and the second is the expected distance from a single
ˉ 2 ]. The total payoffs to the agents
draw from a uniform distribution on [0, λ
producing goods 1 and 2, under the buy local arrangement, are now
ˉ1 + 3 λ
ˉ2 + 3 λ
ˉ 1 and Λ − λ
ˉ2.
Λ−λ
4
4
ˉ1
Comparing these results we find that, no matter what the values of λ
ˉ
and λ2 , the total surplus to the two agents in the buy local arrangement is
higher than the sum of the surpluses they earn without the arrangement.
However, this surplus may be asymmetrically distributed, to the point that
one agent may be unwilling to participate in the arrangement. The conditions for both agents to benefit are
ˉ
ˉ
3ˉ
ˉ 2 and 3 λ
ˉ2 − λ
ˉ1,
ˉ 2 > λ1 − 5 λ
ˉ 1 > λ2 − 5 λ
λ1 − λ
4
6
4
6
2
2
or
ˉ 2 and 3λ
ˉ 2 > 2λ
ˉ1,
ˉ 1 > 2λ
3λ
and hence an arrangement is not possible when there is too much asymmetry
across agents.

4
4.1

Discussion
Enforcement

The essence of a buy local arrangement is that consumers sometimes buy
from within the arrangement, even though they would prefer to purchase
outside. There must then be some enforcement mechanism to prevent an
agent in a buy local arrangement from taking advantage of her partners
by enjoying their purchases while never foregoing an outside purchase. We
think in terms of three prototype enforcement mechanisms, corresponding to
three types of buy local arrangements mentioned in Section 1: local currency
(which we discuss in Section 4.2), monitoring, and reciprocal relationships.
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4.1.1

Effective Monitoring

A buy local arrangement need not involve a formal institution like local currencies if the participants can monitor one another’s activities and respond
to failures to buy within the arrangement. For example, Alice may find that
if she neglects opportunities to buy from others in the arrangement, then
they do not purchase from her. It is a familiar idea that variations in continuation play can prompt people to resist myopic incentives, provided that
their current actions can be monitored sufficiently precisely. Her compatriots
in the buy local arrangement must be sufficiently likely to observe that Alice
neglected an opportunity to buy inside the agreement. This reinforces our
belief, albeit for different reasons than those lying behind Proposition 4, that
buy local arrangements are most likely to be successful among closely-knit
groups of people. Within such groups, an active gossip network may amplify
the power of monitoring. Ellickson’s (1991) book highlights the important
role of gossip in sustaining cooperation among the California ranchers he
studies.
4.1.2

Reciprocal Relationships

Even if agents can never observe the buyer opportunities of other agents, buy
local arrangements may be sustainable as reciprocal relationships. Suppose
a pair of agents consider a buy local arrangement, knowing that both would
be better off if each purchased from the other whenever taking a distance
draw from the other, but that such distance draws do not always occur and
distance draws cannot be observed. Each agent is then tempted to cheat
on the arrangement, buying outside whenever she prefers, knowing that this
will be interpreted as the absence of an inside distance draw.
However, there is an efficiency-increasing arrangement that is incentive
compatible. Suppose that the agents agree to use the following rule of
whether to buy or not buy:
• If in the last transaction in which one agent made a purchase and
one did not, it was agent i who made the purchase, then agent i will
buy from agent j whenever her distance draw from j is lower than
all outside draws, and agent j will buy from i the next time j takes
a distance draw from i that does not exceed j’s minimum draw by a
parameter Δ.
Whenever agent i buys from j but j does not buy from i, then i is
subsequently free to purchase from her most preferred seller, until j next
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purchases from i, at which point the roles are reversed. Agent i’s continuation payoff is highest immediately after i has purchased from j, and i will
thus be willing to do so even if j is not the lowest distance draw for i, as long
as the difference in distance draws is not too large. We thus find a value of
Δ for which this behavior constitutes an equilibrium.
The enforcement mechanism in the preceding subsection is reminiscent
of the favor-trading arrangements studied by Abdulkadiroǧlu and Bagwell
(2013).9 A key difference is that in their model it is clear when a favor has
been done. In our case, only the purchase decision by agent i is observable,
but j cannot observe whether this purchase is myopically optimal for i or
whether i has conferred a “favor” on j by purchasing from j despite a lower
distance draw elsewhere.

4.2

Local Currencies

There are estimated to be more than 4,000 local currencies throughout the
world (Lietaer and Dunne, 2013), with one of the most visible being Ithaca
Hours, circulating in Ithaca, New York. In 1998 there were about 1,300 users
of Ithaca Hours who conduced about $2 million worth of trade in Hours (cf.
Good, 1998).10
A local currency such as Ithaca Hours is accepted at a fixed exchange rate
by participating local businesses, but not by other businesses. Consequently,
the currency is dominated (at least weakly) by US currency, which can be
used in any transaction. Therefore, holders of the currency prefer to spend
the currency rather than US currency when possible. If the preference is
strict, a consumer will prefer to patronize a participating business even if
the price-quality package is a bit less than that offered by a nonparticipating
business. Given this preference, firms benefit from participation because of
the diversion of purchases from nonparticipating businesses, as in the case
of a buy local arrangement.
As in the equilibria of the model analyzed in Section 3, the benefits to a
seller accepting a local currency depend on two things: how many purchases
are diverted from outside the participating group to inside, and the cost to
the seller due to his own diversion of purchases outside the group to (less
9
See Hauser and Hopenhayn (2008) for a related model, and Ellickson (1991) for a very
nice discussion of informal favor trading.
10
People can purchase Ithaca hours from the issuers (who use the proceeds to promote
Ithaca hours via advertising and discount coupons) with U.S. currency at an exchange
rate of $10 for one Hour. Businesses and individuals who agree to accept Ithaca Hours
are paid two Hours for joining the arrangement.
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desirable) purchases inside the group. If the amount of local currency is
small, it will be a small percentage of a seller’s revenue. A person who has
a small amount of local currency may find it relatively easy to use the local
currency for purchases within the group only when they are his first choice.
In this case, no purchases are diverted from outside the group to inside.
When the amount of local currency is larger, a person will find that his
stock of local currency grows unless he uses it for inside purchases that he
would otherwise not make. The increase in the amount of local currency
increases the wedge between the person’s value of inside currency and US
currency, and consequently of the proportion of trades that are made inside.
When the amount of local currency is sufficiently large, all purchases will
be inside when possible, endogenously mimicking the equilibrium behavior
in the model above.
Local currencies will be relatively ineffective when the proportion of sellers who accept the local currency is too large. In that case, most draws
are likely to come from participating sellers, and consumers will have little reason to choose an inside seller unless he is the unconstrained most
attractive.
An attractive aspect of a buy local arrangement induced by a local currency is that agents will divert a purchase from an outside seller to an inside
seller only when the difference in the values of the two to the buyer is not
too large. The seller trades off the benefit of using some of the (dominated)
local currency with the cost of purchasing a lesser valued good. This reduces
the possible inefficiency that arises when all purchases must be inside (as in
the simple buy local arrangement of Section 3) even when there is a loss to
the trading pair.
Many local currencies have another interesting feature: local currencies
may build into their currency demurrage, or the cost of holding the currency.
Chiemgauer, a local currency in Bavaria linked to the euro, circulates as
bills in denominations from 1 to 50 euros that must be validated every three
months at a cost of two percent of the value of the bill (Tóth, 2011). This
of course ensures that they are dominated by the euro, and gives holders an
incentive not only to use them when possible, but to use them quickly. A
consumer holding local currency that depreciates will have a higher threshold for purchasing from a producer who accepts the local currency than the
threshold for purchasing from a nonparticipating producer. This reinforces
the incentive for consumers to divert purchases from outside producers to
insider producers, enhancing the benefit to the latter of accepting the local currency. Also, in a dynamic world, there can be an efficiency gain in
“speeding up” consumption essentially for similar reasons as in our model
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above. When the marginal gain to the seller is positive, there can be an
aggregate efficiency gain when consumers purchase more frequently.

4.3
4.3.1

Related Ideas
Barter

The essence of a buy local arrangement is that participants can tie their
transactions—agent 1 buys more frequently from agent 2 because 2 buys
more frequently from 1. Barter shares the idea of tying transactions since
it involves physically exchanging our products.
One possibility is that barter organizations are simply convenient ways
of organizing buy local arrangements. 11 Alternatively, barter may relax liquidity constraints. Prendergast and Stole (2001) examine a model in which
firms can offer optimal screening mechanisms rather than simply posting
prices, so that the motivation for buying locally examined in this paper
does not arise, and then show that barter can be useful in the presence of
liquidity constraints. 12
4.3.2

Strategic Trade Policy

There is a large literature addressing the possibility that countries can gain
by setting tariffs that make it more attractive for domestic consumers to
purchase from domestic rather than foreign producers. However, the forces
captured by the standard such model differ from those studied here in that
gains arise because the tariff effectively allows domestic agents to wield
market power, decreasing the demand and hence the price of imported goods.
(Johnson (1953–1954) is an early reference, and Syropoulos (2002) a more
recent one.)
More recent attention has been devoted to strategic trade arrangements,
under which participating countries agree not to employ tariffs when transacting with each other. One might view these as attempts to divert pur11
See, for example, “The Cash-Strapped Turn to Barter,” by Michey Meece, New York
Times, November 12, 2008.
12
Ellingsen (2000) similarly explores a link between liquidity constraints and barter. He
shows that barter can serve as a screening device, revealing information to sellers about a
buyer’s financial position if there is both imperfect competition and liquidity constraints.
Ellingsen hints that he could imagine barter in a world of imperfect competition devoid
of liquidity constraints, but there sees no reason why we couldn’t simply obviate the need
for barter by appropriate price discrimination, which we assume not possible.
There is a literature beginning with Caves (1974) that also examines barter as a possible
way to price discriminate.
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chases from countries outside the strategic trade arrangement to those inside, much like our buy local arrangement. However, strategic trade arrangements are often studied in perfectly competitive models, precluding
the type of gains that appear in our model and ensuring that the benefits of
the arrangement must come through price effects. The obvious explanation
for such arrangements is that it allows countries to avoid inefficient “prisoners’ dilemma” outcomes of noncooperative attempts to improve the terms
of trade by raising tariffs.13
“New trade” theory examines models of imperfectly competitive firms,
often deliberately constructed so as to exclude the terms-of-trade effect that
are the focus of the traditional literature. Consumers have a taste for variety that calls for them to consume a basket of all firms’ goods. A strategic
trade arrangement makes domestic goods cheaper and foreign goods more
expensive, causing consumers to substitute into domestic goods, in the process reducing the variety of their consumption. This gives rise to a price
index effect, highlighted (for example) by Venables (1987). However, as
Ossa (2011) argues, firms will also relocate from the foreign to the domestic
country. Since they are imperfectly competitive and earn positive profits,
this relocation brings a welfare gain. The key difference here is that our buy
local arrangements require no relocations to bring welfare gains.

A
A.1

Proofs
Calculations, Section 2.

The probability that consumer aij purchases good k from firm f`k is, conditional on the draw λ`k ,
Pr(λ`k + p`k < λ`0 k + p`0 k |λ`k )


1
= 1 − (λ`k + p`k − p`0 k )


0

if λ`k + p`k − p`0 k < 0
if λ`k + p`k − p`0 k ∈ (0, 1)
if λ`k + p`k − p`0 k > 1.

Lemma 1. Suppose |p`k − p`0 k | ≤ 1. Firm f`k ’s expected profit is
(
2p`k [1 − p`k + p`0 k ]2
if p`k ≥ p`0 k
π `k (p`k , p`0 k ) =
2
2p`k [2 − (1 − p`0 k + p`k ) ] if p`k < p`0 k .
13

Bagwell and Staiger (2002) suggest this as the traditional economic and political
economy approach to trade.
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Proof. The expected profit is 4 times the expected profit per consumer,
which is p`k times the unconditional probability of a consumer purchase.
Suppose p`k ≥ p`0 k . The unconditional probability that a consumer
purchases from f`k is
Z 1−p`k +p 0
` k
1 − (λ + p`k − p`0 k ) dλ
0


1 2 1−p`k +p`0 k
= [1 − (p`k − p`0 k )]λ − λ
2
0
1
2
= (1 − p`k + p`0 k ) .
2
Suppose p`k < p`0 k . The expected probability that a consumer purchases
from f`k is
Z p 0 −p`k
Z 1
` k
1dλ +
1 − (λ + p`k − p`0 k ) dλ
0

p`0 k −p`k

= (p`0 k − p`k ) +



1
[1 − (p`k − p`0 k )]λ − λ2
2

1
= (p`0 k − p`k ) − [(p`0 k − p`k )2 − 1]
2

1
=
2 − (1 − p`0 k + p`k )2 .
2



1

p`0 k −p`k

It is immediate that in any monopolistic equilibrium, we have |p`k −
p`0 k | < 1 (otherwise, a firm is making zero sales and has a profitable deviation).
We now argue every monopolistic equilibrium is symmetric. Suppose
not, and that (p`k , p`0 k ) is a monopolistic equilibrium with p`k < p`0 k . Since
prices are interior, each firm’s first order condition must be satisfied. For
firm f`k , we have
0 = [2 − (1 − p`0 k + p`k )2 ] + p`k [−2(1 − p`0 k + p`k )]
= 2 − (1 − p`0 k + p`k )(1 − p`0 k + 3p`k ).

Since 1 − p`0 k + p`k ∈ (0, 1), this implies
2 < 1 − p`0 k + 3p`k ⇐⇒ 1 < 3p`k − p`0 k
and so p`0 k > p`k > 1/2.
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For firm f`0 k , we have
0 = [1 − p`0 k + p`k ]2 − 2p`0 k [1 − p`0 k + p`k ]
= (1 − p`0 k + p`k )(1 − 3p`0 k + p`k ).

Since 1 − p`0 k + p`k 6= 0, we have
1 = 3p`0 k − p`k ,
and so p`0 k < 1/2, a contradiction.
Given the piecewise description of the firm’s payoff function, it is not
obvious that first order conditions hold with equality in a symmetric equilibrium (we deal with this explicitly in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix
A.2). However, it turns out that they do, which immediately yields pricing
at 1/2.

A.2

Proof of Proposition 1

Let p∗ be a candidate symmetric equilibrium price. Consider a particular
firm, identified as firm 1, who sets price p1 . A consumer will purchase from
this firm only if the sum of the consumer’s distance draw and price is less
than the corresponding term for each of the other n − 1 firms from which the
consumer draws, i.e., if and only if λ1 + p1 − p∗ < min{λ2 , . . . , λn }, where
λ2 , . . . , λn denote the other draws. The probability of this event, conditional
on the draw λ1 , is
Pr(λ1 + p1 − p∗ < min{λ2 , . . . , λn }|λ1 )


1
= (1 − (λ1 + p1 − p∗ ))n−1


0

if λ1 + p1 − p∗ < 0
if λ1 + p1 − p∗ ∈ (0, 1)
if λ1 + p1 − p∗ > 1.

Lemma 2. Suppose |p1 − p∗ | ≤ 1. The firm’s expected profit (per consumer)
is
(
p1
[1 − p1 + p∗ ]n
if p1 ≥ p∗
∗
π(p1 , p ) = n ∗
p1 [p − p1 + n1 (1 − (p∗ − p1 )n )] if p1 < p∗ .

Proof. The expected profit per consumer is simply price times the unconditional probability of a consumer purchase.
Suppose p1 ≥ p∗ . The unconditional probability is
Z 1−p1 +p∗
[1 − (λ1 + p1 − p∗ )]n−1 dλ1
0
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−1
=
[1 − (λ1 + p1 − p∗ )]n
n
1
= (1 − p1 + p∗ )n .
n

1−p1 +p∗
0

Suppose p1 < p∗ . The expected probability is
Z 1
Z p∗ −p1
1dλ1 +
[1 − (λ1 + p1 − p∗ )]n−1 dλ1
p∗ −p1

0

1
= (p − p1 ) − [1 − (λ + p1 − p∗ )]n
n
1
= (p∗ − p1 ) + [1 − (p∗ − p1 )n ].
n
∗

1
p∗ −p1

If p1 = p∗ is to be optimal, then the left derivative of π(p1 , p∗ ) with
respect to p1 evaluated at p1 = p∗ cannot be strictly positive and the right
derivative of π(p1 , p∗ ) with respect to p1 evaluated at p1 = p∗ cannot be
strictly negative. The left derivative of π(p1 , p∗ ) with respect to p1 evaluated
at p1 = p∗ is
p∗ − p 1 +

1
[1 − (p∗ − p1 )n ] − p1 + (p∗ − p1 )n−1 p1 ,
n

and this is not strictly negative at p1 = p∗ if
1
− p∗ ≥ 0.
n
The right derivative of π(p1 , p∗ ) with respect to p1 evaluated at p1 = p∗ is
−p1 [1 − p1 + p∗ ]n−1 +

1
[1 − p1 + p∗ ]n ,
n

and this is not strictly positive at p1 = p∗ if
1
− p∗ ≤ 0.
n
Combining these two inequalities, we conclude that in any symmetric monopolistic equilibrium, we have p∗ = 1/n.
It remains to verify that given p∗ = 1/n, firm 1 does not have an incentive
to deviate. It is straightforward to verify that
∂π
≥0
∂p1

∀p1 ≤ p∗ =
28

1
n

and

∂π
1
≤ 0 ∀p1 ≥ p∗ = ,
∂p1
n
so there is no incentive to deviate.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2

(2.1) The advent of a buy local arrangement affects the number of expected
customers for each firm, but not the expected profit per customer, and hence
the equilibrium price remains 1/n.
(2.2) The buy local arrangement for AL affects the payoffs of its members
only if a consumer in AL takes one distance draw from outside AL , and
n − 1 distance draws from inside AL , and draws the minimum distance from
outside. In this circumstance, the consumer diverts a purchase that would
ordinarily have gone outside AL to a firm inside AL . This purchase is made
at price 1/n, and so the gain (to some the agent in AL from whom the
good is purchased) in this event is 1/n. The cost to the consumer is the
difference between the expected value of the first-order statistic of n draws
from uniform distributions on [0, 1] (the expected distance if the consumer is
free to purchase outside) and the expected value of the second order statistic
(the expected distance if the consumer is required to purchase inside). The
expected value of the kth order statistic is k/(n + 1), so the gain from the
buy local arrangement exceeds the expected cost if
1
2
1
>
−
,
n
n+1 n+1
which is obvious.
This ensures that every diversion of a purchase from outside to inside the
arrangement yields a positive net benefit to the members of the arrangement.
Of course, the costs and benefits of any particular such diversion may accrue
to different people. However, the symmetry properties of the arrangement
ensure that the net benefits are uniformly distributed across the members
of the buy local arrangement, and hence that each member benefits from
the arrangement.

A.4

Proof of Proposition 3

Applying Proposition 4, the simple buy local arrangement is profitable under
a uniform network if (4) holds. In the current case,
Pr(E2 | E1 ) =

1
n−2 L−1
+
.
n−1 n−1N −2
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In particular, we know from the definitions of E1 and E2 that the lowest
draw is from outside the arrangement, and at least one draw is from inside.
With probability 1/(n − 1), the latter is the second lowest, accounting for
the first term. With probability (n − 2)/(n − 1), the latter is not the lowest,
in which case the second lowest draw is equally likely to be any of the N − 2
remaining firms, L − 1 of which are inside the arrangement. Given this
calculation, condition (4) holds if

that is,

1
1
n−2 L−1
+
>1− ,
n−1 n−1N −2
n

L−1 >
=




1
1
n−1
1− −
(N − 2)
n n−1 n−2
n2 − 3n + 1
(N − 2).
n2 − 2n
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